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Commentaries
Panel One: Unfunding Terror-Perspectives on Unfunding
Terror*
Commentary by Michael P. Malloy-
This panel is intended to examine certain U.S. and multilateral responses to
the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 that were
specifically designed to deny terrorists access to financial resources. We are
concerned primarily with two types of response-the blocking of assets in which
a terrorist has a direct or indirect interest' and prohibitions against money
laundering'-as well as more general prohibitions against the provision ofresources to terrorists.3
I. INTRODUCTION
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 remain difficult to comprehend at a
human level, but the legal and policy effects of these events are beginning to
unfold. It is already clear the sanctions program will have significant implications
for economic sanctions theory and techniques, and it also raises important issues
for administrative law and practice, for global technology, and for public
international law and international regulation of trade and finance. By way of an
introduction to the issues, I would like to focus on the implications for economic
sanctions theory and on the effects on transborder banking activities.
* Copyright © 2003 by Michael P. Malloy. Portions of this essay are drawn from the author's
forthcoming book, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION (Concise Hornbook Series, 2d ed., Thomson West 2003).
** Distinguished Professor and Scholar, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Georgetown University.
1. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,224, §§ 1-2, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001) (blocking property of
and prohibiting transactions with terrorists or persons supporting terrorism) [hereinafter Exec. Order No.
13,224); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th Sess., at 1(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001), reprinted in 40
INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1278 (2001) (mandating "freeze" without delay of funds and other financial assets or
economic resources of terrorists and other participants and facilitators) (hereinafter Resolution No. 1373).
2. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 280 (codified at scattered sections
of, inter alia, 12, 18, 31 U.S.C.) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act]; Resolution No. 1373, supra note 1, § 4
(emphasizing need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels
against "transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal
movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials").
3. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,224, supra note 1, § 6 (calling for bilateral and multilateral cooperation
and coordination to deny financing and financial services to terrorists and terrorist organizations); Resolution
No. 1373, supra note 1, §§ l(a)-(b), (d), 2(c)-(e), 5 (mandating prevention and suppression of financing of
terrorist acts, criminalizing willful provision or collection of funds to carry out terrorist acts, prohibiting
provision of "funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services" for benefit of
terrorists or persons facilitating or participating in terrorist acts; declares knowing financing of terrorist acts to
be "contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations").
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II. PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY AUTHORITY
The President had already taken a number of dramatic steps in response to
the terrorist attack, including military activity, diplomatic overtures, and
domestic political initiatives before the establishment of formal sanctions. On
September 14, 2001, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 7463,'
declaring a national emergency with respect to the attacks, and indicating his
intention to invoke statutory authorities to activate national emergency military
reserves and to recall personnel to active duty. At that stage, however, the
President's action did not expand the U.S. economic sanctions that were in place
since the second half of the 1990s against the assets of terrorists- and against the
6Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
This situation rapidly changed. On September 23, 2001, the President issued
Executive Order No. 13,224,' "blocking the property of, and prohibiting
transactions with, persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support
terrorism." Invoking such authority as the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA), section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act
(UNPA),9 and various U.N. Security Council Resolutions, the order declared a
national emergency to deal with the "unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States," posed by
the terrorist attacks.' 0
Had this been all that the preamble of the order said, it would have read like
countless other executive orders declaring national emergencies issued by
presidents since the IEEPA was enacted in December 1977." Blocking of
4. Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199
(Sept. 14, 2001).
5. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995) (prohibiting transactions with
terrorists who threaten the Middle East peace process); Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 595
(implementing Exec. Order No. 12,947). See also Terrorism List Government Sanctions Regulations, Foreign
Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 596 (implementing section 321 of Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2332d); Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 597 (implementing sections 302-303 of AEDPA, 8 U.S.C. § 1189, 18
U.S.C. § 2339B). On the relationship between the successive antiterrorism sanctions programs, see Holy Land
Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding validity of successive
designations of charitable organization and blocking of assets); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d
748 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding blocking of assets).
6. Exec. Order No. 13,129, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,759 (July 4, 1999) (imposing economic sanctions against
Taliban).
7. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079.
8. IEEPA, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1706. For discussion of the IEEPA as a statutory source of economic
sanctions authority, see MICHAEL P. MALLOY, UNrrED STATES ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE
171-86 (2001).
9. UNPA, 22 U.S.C.A. § 287(c). For discussion of UNPA as a statutory source of economic sanctions
authority, see MALLOY, supra note 8, at 162-70.
10. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079.
11. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701, supra note 8 (reproducing executive orders issued under IEEPA).
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terrorist assets certainly resulted from the order,'" but the order went on to find
that "because of the pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial foundation
of foreign terrorists, financial sanctions may be appropriate for those foreign
persons that support or otherwise associate with these foreign terrorists."' 3 It also
found that "a need exist[ed] for further consultation and cooperation with, and
sharing of information by, United States and foreign financial institutions as an
additional tool to enable the United States to combat the financing of terrorism."'
4
With these two findings-and the substantive steps that the order took in
response-the President' initiative was transformed into one of the most creative
and savvy approaches to the use of economic sanctions in the past ten years (i.e.,
since the original Iraq sanctions imposed by the President's father 5), and possibly
the past twenty years (i.e., since the original Iran hostage sanctions of 1979-
198116).
III. SANCTION STRATEGY
The strategy of the new executive order is distinctive at a number of levels. The
new sanctions program intimately and explicitly ties the imposition of sanctions to a
broader array of foreign policy and military responses. For example, section 6 of the
12. See O'Neill Says $24 Million in Assets Frozen as Part of U.S. Response to Terrorist Attacks, BNA
INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 15, 2001, at d3; Cf Toshio Aritake, Japan Freezes $750,000 in Assets of
Taliban, Affiliates, Ministry Says, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 23, 2001, at d2.
13. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079.
14. Id. In fact, cooperation swiftly emerged from close allies such as Japan (see Eric J. Lyman & Diana I.
Gregg, Japan Takes Steps to Find, Freeze Assets of Taliban, Osama Bin Laden, Other Groups, BNA INT'L Bus. &
FIN. DAILY, Sept. 25, 2001, at d3), the United Kingdom (see Patrick Tracey, U.K. Law Boosts Crackdown on
Terror Cash, Foreign Bribes, BNA BANKING DAILY, Nov. 15, 2001, at d7), and the G-7 countries (see Nancy
Ognanovich, Finance Ministers Back U.S. Plan Aimed at Freezing Terrorists' Assets, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN.
DAILY, Apr. 23, 2002, at d8). Vigorous cooperation even emerged from the European Union. See EU Moving
Against Bin Laden-Related Funds, Requests Supporting Evidence from Treasury, BNA BANKING DAILY, Oct. 1,
2001, at d2; Arthur Rogers, EU Asset-Freezing Plan Rushed Through European Parliament with Minimal Dissent,
BNA BANKING DAILY, Oct. 5, 2001, at d4; Joe Kirwin, European Commission Provides Legal Basis For Freezing
Suspected Terrorist Bank Assets, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 15, 2001, at d2; Joe Kirwin, EU Leaders
Reaffirm Support For U.S., Outline Efforts to Combat Terrorism, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 22, 2001, at
d2. But cf Andrew M. Ballard, European Parliament Says EC Dragging Feet on Terrorist Asset Freezing,
Laundering Bill, BNA BANKING DAtLY, Oct. 25, 2001, at d4; Nancy Ognanovich, EU Officials Evaluating Bush
Call For 50-Step Plan to Fight Terrorism, BNA BANKING DAILY, Oct. 29, 2001, at d2. Some indications of
cooperation even arose in Saudi Arabia. See Saudi Government Joins U.S. in Freezing Terror-Linked Fund, BNA
INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Mar. 12, 2002, at d2.
15. Exec. Order No. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (Aug. 2, 1990) (imposing sanctions against Iraq and
occupied Kuwait under IEEPA); Exec. Order No. 12,724, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089 (Aug. 9, 1990) (conforming U.S.
sanctions to requirements of U.N. Security Council Resolution 661; invoking IEEPA and UNPA). For
discussion of U.S. and U.N. sanctions against Iraq in response to the invasion of Kuwait, see MALLOY, supra
note 8, at 555-607.
16. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979) (blocking Iranian Government assets);
Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,099 (Apr. 7, 1980) (imposing trade embargo on Iran); Exec. Order No.
12,211, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,685 (Apr. 17, 1980) (expanding sanctions against Iran). For discussion of the 1979-
1981 U.S. sanctions against Iran in response to the hostage taking, see MALLOY, supra note 8, at 90-98.
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order immediately triggered consultation and coordination with other countries to
achieve the objectives of the order.'7 Furthermore, the order stated the declaration of
the emergency (and hence the imposition of sanctions) was "in furtherance of [the]
proclamation" activating the military reserves.'8 As in the case of the Iraq sanctions,
therefore, the economic response was intended-but this time explicitly so-to be
only one phase in what would eventually involve military or police action as well.
In addition, the Administration found a way to sidestep--or at least to
blunt-the issue that is typically raised by U.S. allies and critics alike against the
application of U.S. economic sanctions, namely that they are impermissibly
extraterritorial in effect. The premise underlying this program is that, in response
to "universal" criminal acts (terrorism, like piracy, crimes against humanity, and
wars of aggression, is subject to criminal enforcement regardless of where it
takes place), the President called upon other states to identify and freeze terrorist-
related assets under their own authority. If a state did not take appropriate action,
it may trigger the "vicarious" or "accessory" liability principle that the President
has enunciated elsewhere (e.g., in his speech to the joint session of Congress
following the terrorist attacks). The President might sanction such states for their
active or passive participation in a "universal" crime.
IV. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION
On Friday, September 28, 2001, following fast upon the heels of these
presidential actions, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted the U.S.-
sponsored Resolution No. 1373, requiring all U.N. member states to sanction the
financing, training and movement of terrorists, and requiring their cooperation in
any campaign against terrorists, including military action. In effect, the resolution
completely vindicates the declarations of the executive order: that terrorism was
indeed an unusual and extraordinary threat; that the pervasiveness and
expansiveness of the financing of terrorists made sanctions against foreign
persons "support[ing] or otherwise associat[ing] with" terrorists appropriate; and
that consultation and cooperation with, and sharing of information by, U.S. and
foreign financial institutions was necessary to combat terrorism.
The U.N. sanctions required the immediate freezing of the financial
resources of terrorists and their organizations. Once fully implemented by the
member states, the U.N. sanctions also would include required efforts to prevent
and suppress terrorism, prohibitions against making funds available to terrorist
organizations, and the suppression of recruitment by such organizations and the
elimination of their weapon supplies. In addition, the member states were
required to deny safe havens to anyone who finances, plans, supports, or commits
terrorist acts, or who provides safe havens to terrorists. They were also
17. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 6, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,081.
18. Id. at 49,079.
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committed to providing assistance in criminal investigations of terrorism and to
preventing the movement of terrorists and terrorist groups through more effective
control over borders and travel documents.
However, some gray areas exist in the resolution, particularly in comparison
with the immediate U.S. response. For example, section 3(d) of the order defines
terrorism as an activity that involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human
life, property, or infrastructure and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce
a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking. Section l(a)-(d) of the order
describes the kinds of persons considered to be terrorists, and an annex to the
order listed twenty-seven individuals and organizations identified by the order as
terrorists or supporters of terrorism. In contrast, the U.N. resolution does not
define or otherwise explain who is a terrorist. In addition, while the order invokes
the necessary U.S. statutory authority-the IEEPA and the UNPA-for
immediate imposition of the sanctions, the current national laws of the other 188
U.N. member states did not uniformly provide authority for implementation of
the terms of the resolution. Hence, the exact contours of the multilateral response
to terrorism remained relatively fuzzy for a considerable period of time, as
member states took action to align their national laws with the requirements of
the resolution.' 9
V. USA PATRIOT ACT
The final corner piece of the puzzle emerged on October 26, 2001, when the
President signed into law the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.20
Usually referred to by its acronym, USA PATRIOT Act. The act is a multi-
pronged legislative response to the terrorist attacks. While the USA PATRIOT
Act is much broader than the anti-money laundering provisions of Title III, Title
III accounts for approximately one-third of the entire text of the Act and will
probably have long-term compliance implications far beyond the immediate
terrorism crisis. 2' The provisions in Title III, the International Money Laundering
19. For country reports on implementation and other documentation concerning the work of the
Counter-Terrorism Committee established by Resolution No. 1373, see http://www.un.org/docs/sc/committees/
1373/top.htm.
20. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 2.
21. Although the act may be terminated under the joint congressional resolution procedure in § 303, as
of the beginning of fiscal year 2005, this seems an unlikely outcome in the current political climate. As yet,
there has been no significant litigation concerning Title III. See generally L & J Crew Station, LLC v. Banco
Popular de Puerto Rico, 278 F. Supp. 2d 547, 560 (D.V.1. 2003) (holding, inter alia, that USA PATRIOT Act
did not provide basis for private cause of action on behalf of depositor); Med. Supply Chain, Inc. v. US
Bancorp, NA, C F. Supp. 2d C, 2003 WL 21479192, at 6-8 (D. Kan. 2003) (holding, inter alia, that bank
customer lacked standing to bring claim against bank holding company based upon USA PATRIOT Act, and
that no private right of action existed under Act).
2004 /Panel One: Unfunding Terror-Perspectives on Unfunding Terror
Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001 (IMLAAFA), most directly
affect financial services firms. For example, under section 327, a financial
institution's effectiveness in combating money-laundering has now become an
22
explicit factor in considering approval of bank holding company status or
approval of a bank or savings association merger under the Bank Merger Act.
23
The effects of IMLAAFA go well beyond the policing of classic money
laundering transactions, and must be kept in mind even in situations where such
transactions may not be apparent. In addition, IMLAAFA includes extensive
amendments24 to the Bank Secrecy Act 25 and related provisions of federal law.
These are apparently intended to align reporting, disclosure, and money
laundering requirements of the previous enactments to the provisions of the new
act.
Under section 31 1,26 the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to designate
non-U.S. jurisdictions, classes of transactions, financial institutions, or types of
accounts as being of "primary money laundering concern. 27 As to any of these
designated non-U.S. targets, the Secretary can require domestic financial
institutions and domestic financial agencies to take at least one of the following
five types of specified measures to detect and prevent money laundering: (1)
recordkeeping and reporting of certain financial transactions; (2) obtaining and
retaining information concerning beneficial ownership of any targeted account;
(3) identifying, or obtaining identity information about, persons permitted to use,
or whose transactions are routed through, certain "payable-through" accounts; (4)
identifying or obtaining identity information about persons permitted to use, or
whose transactions are routed through, certain correspondent accounts; and/or (5)
prohibiting or conditioning the opening of certain payable-through or corres-
pondent accounts.
Under section 312,28 financial institutions are required to establish "appropri-
ate, specific, and, where necessary, enhanced, due diligence policies, procedures,
and controls" as to money laundering for U.S. correspondent accounts and private
banking accounts of non-U.S. persons (including a foreign individual visiting the
United States, or a U.S. representative of a non-U.S. person). Furthermore, if a
foreign bank with an "offshore" banking license, or licensed by a country
designated as "noncooperative" by certain intergovernmental organizations (e.g.,
the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering), requests or
maintains a correspondent account with a U.S. financial institution, the latter is
22. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(c)(6) (West 2004).
23. Id. § 1828. See, e.g., FDIC Statement of Policy on Bank Merger Transactions, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,178
(July 23, 2002) (amending Statement of Policy to incorporate USA PATRIOT Act requirement).
24. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 2, at 351-359, 361-363, 365-366, 371-372.
25. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5311 et seq. (West 2004).
26. Id. § 5318A.
27. In this regard, see Treasury Department, Notice, Departmental Offices Designation of Nauru and
Ukraine as Primary Money Laundering Concerns, Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 78,859 (2002).
28. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(i).
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required to establish additional due diligence standards. These include ascertaining
the identity of each owner of the foreign bank (if the foreign bank is not publicly
traded) and ascertaining the identities of other foreign banks that maintain
correspondent accounts with the foreign bank, as well as related due diligence
information. Finally, special due diligence requirements are imposed for "private
banking accounts." These include ascertaining the nominal and beneficial owners
of each account and the source of the funds deposited in such accounts, and
enhanced scrutiny of accounts maintained by senior political figures, or their
immediate families or close associates.
Under section 313,29 "covered financial institutions" are prohibited from
maintaining correspondent accounts for shell banks-banks with no physical
presence in any country-and must take reasonable steps to ensure that
correspondent accounts of foreign banks are not used to provide banking services
to shell banks. A covered financial institution that maintains a correspondent
account in the United States for a foreign bank must maintain records in the United
States identifying the owners of the foreign bank and the name and address of any
U.S. resident who is authorized to accept service of legal process from the Secretary
and the Attorney General for records regarding the correspondent account.
Under section 325,30 the Secretary is given authority to issue rules regulating
the maintenance of concentration accounts 3' by financial institutions, to ensure
that these accounts are not used to mask the interest of any person in the
movement of funds. These regulations must, at a minimum: (1) prohibit financial
institutions from allowing clients to direct funds movements in, out, or through
such accounts; (2) prohibit institutions and their employees from counseling
clients about such accounts; and, (3) require each institution to establish specified
written procedures on documentation of transactions involving concentration
accounts.
The key terms of reference under the IMLAAFA raise a variety of termino-
logical questions that affect the scope of many of the substantive requirements
imposed by the act. Many of these questions are, of course, specifically addressed by
IMLAAFA itself, typically by crossreference to preexisting statutory definitions. For
example, under section 31832 the term "financial institution," used throughout
IMLAAFA, is defined by reference to the term as defined in the Bank Secrecy Act
(BSA).33 There the term includes most financial entities, such as commercial
banks, savings associations, credit unions (added by IMLAAFA section 3 2 1"),
29. Id. § 53180).
30. Id. § 5318(h)(3).
31. The term "concentration account" is not defined by the IMLAAFA. Legislative history of the USA
PATRIOT Act seems to suggest that concentration accounts "are used to commingle related funds temporarily
in one place pending disbursement or the transfer of funds into individual client accounts." 147 Cong. Rec.
S 11,041 (Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
32. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(6) (West 2004).
33. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312(a)(2).
34. Id. § 5312(a)(2)(E).
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broker-dealers, insurance companies, and money transmitters, among others. In
addition, IMLAAFA section 318 includes U.S. branches and agencies of foreign
banks in the term.
A similar-but, significantly not coterminous-concept, "covered financial
institution," is key to the shell bank provisions of IMLAAFA section 31335 and
the bank records provisions of section 319.36 For purposes of section 313, the
term is defined to include only certain selected financial institutions described in
the BSA.37 These include commercial banks, savings associations and other
depository institutions, branches and agencies of foreign banks, and broker-
dealers registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It is not apparent
that the term is so limited for purposes of the bank records provisions. Likewise,
IMLAAFA incorporates the BSA definition of "financial agency." This term
includes any person acting for another as a financial institution, bailee,
depository trustee, or agent, or acting in a similar way relating to financial assets
or gold, or a transaction involving any of these.
The breadth of coverage of the act-applying as it does not just to banks, but
to a wider range of financial institutions-creates its own terminological
difficulties. Certain operative terms are defined differently for different types of
institutions. For example, for banks section 31138 defines "account" as a formal
banking or business relationship established to provide regular services, dealings
and other financial transactions. The term expressly includes demand deposits,
savings deposits and other transaction or asset accounts or extensions of credit.
However, for other institutions section 311 requires the Secretary to define the
term by regulation, after consultation with the appropriate federal functional
regulators. In this regard, the Secretary is required to include within the definition-
to the extent, if any, that the Secretary deems appropriate-arrangements similar to
payable-through and correspondent accounts. The act does not reveal what sort of
accounts these might be.
Similarly, section 311 defines "correspondent account" in different ways for
banks and other financial institutions. For banks, the term is defined as an
"account" established to receive deposits from, to make payments on behalf of,
or handle other financial transactions related to, a foreign financial institution. (It
is not clear from the act itself what "other" transactions are intended.) For other
financial institutions, it is the Secretary's responsibility to determine the extent to
which "arrangements similar to ... correspondent accounts" are to be included
within the definition. The possible discontinuity in the meaning of this term is
potentially significant. For example, four key sections of the IMLAAFA-section
311 (measures against "primary money laundering" targets), section 312'9 (special
35. Id.§5318j).
36. 18 U.S.C.A. § 98 1(k) (West 2004).
37. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312(a)(2)(A)-(G).
38. Id. § 5318(a).
39. Id. § 5318(i).
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due diligence requirements), section 313 (foreign shell bank prohibitions) and section
319 (forfeiture of funds in U.S. interbank accounts)Ball apply to "correspondent
accounts," and this fact makes the scope of the definition of the term critical to
effective implementation of the IMLAAFA.
The same potential discontinuity exists for the term "payable-through account."
For banks, section 311 defines the term to mean an account opened at a depository
institution by a foreign financial institution, by means of which the foreign financial
institution permits its customers to engage, directly or through a subaccount, in
banking activities in the United States. Again, for other financial institutions, it is the
Secretary's responsibility to determine the extent to which "arrangements similar to
payable-through ... accounts" are to be included within the definition.
Other provisions of the IMLAAFA raise analytical issues on their own terms.
For example, section 312 creates a continuum of "enhanced," "additional," and
"special" due diligence requirements that are applicable, under varied circumstances
specified in the section. The "enhanced" due diligence requirements apply to
financial institutions maintaining U.S. correspondent accounts and private banking
accounts of non-U.S. persons. The "additional" requirements apply to accounts
maintained for foreign banks with "offshore" banking licenses or licenses from
countries designated as "noncooperative." The "special" requirements apply to
private banking accounts. What is not clear from the text of the act is where each of
these types of due diligence ends and the next begins. Nor is it clear to what extent
these requirements overlap in their specifics.
Section 313 prohibits "covered financial institutions" from maintaining
correspondent accounts for "shell banks"-banks with no physical presence in
any country-and requires "reasonable steps" to be taken by institutions to
ensure that correspondent accounts of foreign banks are not used to provide
banking services to shell banks. What these steps may be, and how to assess their
reasonableness, are still open questions under the IMLAAFA. Presumably,
compliance issues like these may be clarified by provisions such as IMLAAFA
section 314,40 which encourages bank regulators and law enforcement agencies to
share information with financial institutions.4'
Certain provisions of the IMILAAFA necessarily require further empirical
development before their practical implications will become apparent. For example,
under section 311 the Treasury Secretary is authorized to designate non-U.S.
jurisdictions, classes of transactions, financial institutions and types of accounts that
are of "primary money laundering concern." A progressive delineation of the scope
of such provisions will doubtless emerge through administrative implementation
over time.
40. Section 5311, supra note 25.
41. Cf. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Special Information Sharing Procedures to Deter
Money Laundering and Terrorist Activity, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,579 (2002) (codified at 31 C.F.R. 103.90, 103.100,
103.110, Appendix A) (implementing USA PATRIOT Act § 314 by encouraging information sharing among
financial institutions and federal government law enforcement agencies and among financial institutions).
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The level of agency implementation will be significantly increasing in 2002
as proposed and final rulemaking move forward. For example, on December 28,
2001, Treasury published proposed rules 2 to implement section 313 of the
IMLAAFA, among other things. The proposal establishes a new part 104 of the
Treasury rules. Part 104 will eventually include other regulations implementing
the IMLAAFA money laundering provisions for which the Treasury is authorized
or required to issue regulations. At this point, however, most of part 104 has been
reserved for future regulations.
In fact, in the three-month period ending March 7, 2002, over twenty
separate regulatory issuances were published in the Federal Register that dealt
with one aspect or another of USA PATRIOT Act implementation. Many of
these rulemakings-as well as others that will doubtless follow in due course-
will entail the commitment of additional staff, time and resources on the part of
financial services firms at least for initial design and initiation of appropriate
compliance programs. For example, in February 2002 the SEC published a
proposed NASD rule change 43 that would establish an Anti-Money Laundering
Compliance Program. In March 2002, the SEC published a proposed NYSE rule
change" that would establish a corresponding compliance program for the
exchange.
Overall, IMLAAFA compliance programs must be in place by April 24,
2002. The compliance burdens are particularly evident with respect to reporting
requirements. Proposed rules45 were published on December 31, 2001, that would
require securities broker-dealers to file suspicious activity reports (SARs) with
the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) if they believe
a customer may be violating U.S. laws or regulations. These proposed rules
would implement IMLAAFA section 356.46 In addition, by July 23, 2002,
FinCEN is to develop a secure Web site that financial institutions may use to
report suspicious activities. (SARs are currently filed via paper documents.)
42. Departmental Offices; Counter Money Laundering Requirements-Correspondent Accounts for
Foreign Shell Banks; Recordkeeping and Termination of Correspondent Accounts for Foreign Banks, 66 Fed.
Reg. 67,460 (Dec. 28, 2001) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 104).
43. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Programs, Release No.
34-45457, 67 Fed. Reg. 8565 (Feb. 25, 2002).
44. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. to Adopt NYSE Rule 445, Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Program, Release No. 34-
45487, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,463 (Mar. 7, 2002).
45. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Proposed Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act
Regulations-Requirement of Brokers or Dealers in Securities to Report Suspicious Transactions, 66 Fed. Reg.
67,670 (Dec. 28, 2001) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
46. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318, supra note 25. Final rules were issued in July 2002. Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network; Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations-Requirement that Brokers or
Dealers in Securities Report Suspicious Transactions, 67 Fed. Reg. 44,048 (2002) (codified at 31 C.F.R. 103.11,
103.19) (requiring securities broker-dealers to report suspicious transactions).
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Also on December 31, 2001, an interim final rule 4 was published requiring
persons in nonfinancial trades or businesses to file reports with FinCEN for
transactions in which they receive more than $10,000 in coins or currency in one
transaction (or two or more related transactions). The interim rule was effective
January 1, 2002, but FinCEN simultaneously published identical proposed rules, 8
with written comments due March 1, 2002. (This simultaneous publication of an
"interim" final rule and an identical proposed rule is an increasingly common
administrative practice. It is intended to ensure that, even if there is a serious
procedural objection to the interim final rule, the substance of the rule could still
be preserved by making the proposed rule effective in final form.) An analogous
reporting requirement has also been issued in final form by the IRS, effective
December 31, 2002. 9
This section has already highlighted certain significant terminological,
analytical, and empirical issues raised by the text of the IMLAAFA.50 To what
extent do the currently available administrative issuances help us resolve these
issues?
In many instances, the administrative guidance to date has simply incorpo-
rated terminological concepts established in the IMLAAFA. For example, in the
December 28th proposed rule, the Treasury incorporated the statutory definition
of "covered financial institution," the key to the shell bank provisions of
IMLAAFA section 313 and the bank records provisions of section 319. The term
is defined to include commercial banks, savings associations and other
depository institutions, branches and agencies of foreign banks, and broker-
dealers registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Among other things, the proposed rule would implement IMLAAFA section
313(a), prohibiting covered financial institutions from providing correspondent
accounts to foreign shell banks, and requiring such institutions to take reasonable
steps to ensure that correspondent accounts provided to foreign banks are not
being used indirectly to provide banking services to foreign shell banks. Under
IMLAAFA section 319(b), the proposed rule would also require covered
financial institutions that provide correspondent accounts to foreign banks to
maintain records of ownership of such foreign banks and their U.S. agents who
are designated for service of legal process for records regarding the
correspondent account. Additionally, it would require termination of
47. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations-
Requirement That Nonfinancial Trades or Businesses Report Certain Currency Transactions, 66 Fed. Reg.
67,680 (Dec. 31, 2001) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.30).
48. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations-
Requirement That Nonfinancial Trades or Businesses Report Certain Currency Transactions, 66 Fed. Reg.
67,685 (Jan. 1, 2001) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.30).
49. Amendment to Section 60501 Cross-referencing Section 5331 of Title 31 Relating to Reporting of
Certain Currency Transactions by Nonfinancial Trades or Businesses Under the Bank Secrecy Act, 66 Fed. Reg.
67,687 (2001) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
50. See, e.g., text and accompanying notes 28-36 (discussing terminological issues).
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correspondent accounts of foreign banks that fail to turn over their account
records in response to a lawful request of the Treasury Secretary or the Attorney
General.
Some IMLAAFA provisions require Treasury to make some choices about the
scope of terms. Thus, IMLAAFA section 311 defined "correspondent account" in
different ways for banks and other financial institutions. For banks, the term is
defined as an "'account' established to receive deposits from, to make payments on
behalf of, or handle other financial transactions related to, a foreign financial
institution." For other financial institutions, it is the Secretary's responsibility to
determine the extent to which "arrangements similar to... correspondent accounts"
are included within the definition. When it issued its Interim Guidance in November
2001," the Treasury deferred the question of compliance obligations for securities
brokers and dealers with respect to the BSA 2 until after consultation with the SEC.
With the regulations proposed on December 28, 2001, the Treasury indicated that it
would apply the BSA requirements to brokers and dealers in the same manner that
they apply to other covered financial institutions. The Treasury intends to maintain
parity of treatment between accounts provided to foreign banks by banks and by
broker-dealers, and to treat functionally equivalent accounts-whether maintained by
banks or broker-dealers-in the same manner.
Some key terms were not defined in the IMLAAFA itself, and we must look
to administrative guidance in this regard. For example, the act did not define the
term "foreign bank." Treasury's December 28th proposed rule would define the
term to include any organization: (i) organized under the laws of a foreign
country; (ii) engaging in the business of banking; (iii) recognized as a bank by
the bank supervisory or monetary authority of the country of its organization or
principal banking operations; and, (iv) receiving deposits in the regular course of
its business. "Foreign bank" would also include a branch of a foreign bank
located in a territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa,
or the Virgin Islands. "Foreign bank" would not include an agency or branch of a
foreign bank located in the United States or an insured bank organized in a
territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the Virgin
Islands. (These entities are themselves "covered financial institutions" under the
act.) In addition, a foreign central bank or foreign monetary authority that
functions as a central bank is not a "foreign bank" for these purposes.
Other provisions of the IMLAAFA raise analytical issues on their on terms.
For example, IMLAAFA section 312 creates a continuum of "enhanced," "addi-
tional," and "special" due diligence requirements that are applicable, under
varied circumstances specified in the section. The act does not elaborate on the
content of these due diligence obligations; nor is it clear to what extent these
51. Departmental Offices; Interim Guidance Concerning Compliance by Covered U.S. Financial
Institutions with New Statutory Anti-Money Laundering Requirements Regarding Correspondent Accounts
Established or Maintained for Foreign Banking Institutions, Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,342 (2001).
52. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(j)-(k).
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requirements might overlap. By April 2002, rules to implement IMLAAFA
section 312 should be proposed to address due diligence requirements for
financial institutions administering, maintaining, or managing private banks
accounts or correspondent accounts covered by the act. Final rules are required to
become effective by July 2002.
IMLAAFA section 313(a) prohibited covered financial institutions from
maintaining correspondent accounts for "shell banks," and required the taking of
"reasonable steps" by institutions to ensure that correspondent accounts of
foreign banks are not used to provide banking services to shell banks. The
Treasury rules proposed on December 28, 2001 would implement section 313.
The rules codify, with some modifications, the Treasury's November interim
guidance on the subject. The proposed rules still would not prescribe what
constitutes "reasonable steps" under 31 U.S.C. section 5318(j), but it does
provide a safe harbor if a covered financial institution uses model certifications in
appendices to the proposed rule.53
Administrative efforts are still at a relatively early implementation stage, and
it will be a while before empirical developments, like the Treasury designations
of non-U.S. jurisdictions, classes of transactions, financial institutions and types
of accounts that are of "primary money laundering concern" under IMLAAFA
section 311, are fully in place. We have begun to see more designations of
foreign terrorist organizations54 pursuant to USA PATRIOT Act section 411 (c),55
but these efforts are only of indirect interest to financial services firms.
Some of these empirical concerns should be eased as interaction between the
Treasury and other interested administrative agencies on the one hand and
regulated financial services firms on the other continue over time. For example,
an interim final rule 6 was published by FinCEN on March 4, 2002, to implement
the IMLAAFA section 314 information sharing procedures. The interim rule was
effective immediately, but FinCEN simultaneously published an identical
proposed rule,57 with written comments due by April 3, 2002. Such procedures
should promote cooperation among financial institutions, regulators, and law
enforcement entities in identifying persons who may be involved in terrorism or
money laundering.
53. Appendix A, Appendix B, set forth in Departmental Offices; Counter Money Laundering
Requirements-Correspondent Accounts for Foreign Shell Banks; Record Keeping and Termination of
Correspondent Accounts for Foreign Banks, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,460 (Dec. 28, 2001) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
pt. 104).
54. See, e.g., Designation of 39 "Terrorist Organizations" under the PATRIOT Act", Notice, 66 Fed.
Reg. 63,620 (2001); Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism' Designation of Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,492 (2001) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
55. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a) (2004).
56. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Special Information Sharing Procedures to Deter Money
Laundering and Terrorist Activity, 67 Fed. Reg. 9874 (2002) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
57. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Special Information Sharing Procedures to Deter Money
Laundering and Terrorist Activity, 67 Fed. Reg. 9879 (Mar. 4, 2002) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
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VI. OTHER IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSBORDER BANKING
Whatever the uncertainties about the full legal expanse of the multilateral
response to the terrorist attacks, a number of features are clear even now. The
implications for transborder banking are obviously serious.
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 13,224 blocks "all property and interests in
property" of persons targeted by the order if the property is in the United States
or later comes within the United States, or within the possession or control of a
U.S. person (which is defined to include a foreign branch of a U.S.-based bank).
Presumably, blocked assets would include such items as bank accounts, assets
held in trust, and funds in the course of transaction through the banking system.
Section 2(a) goes on to prohibit any "transaction or dealing" in blocked assets by
any U.S. person or any person within the United States. The blocking applies
even if a preexisting contract with respect to the property or transaction requires
the U.S. party to perform, and even if the property or transaction was covered by
a preexisting license or permit from the U.S. Government.
At first glance, this might seem to be a relatively discrete group of potential
bank clients and customers. If so, compliance with the sanctions as applied to
transborder banking would be easily sustainable. However, the reach of the order
is potentially much broader, and markedly more dynamic. As a result,
transborder banking is likely to be burdened by considerable compliance and
agency costs. This will have implications for the global technology on which
international banking relies.
For example, under section 1(d) of the order, targeted persons include those
determined by the Treasury Secretary (in consultation with the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Homeland Defense, and the Attorney General) to be assisting in,
sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or
financial or other services to or in support of, terrorism or persons listed in the
annex or otherwise determined to be subject to the order. Persons may also be
blocked if the Secretary determines that they are "otherwise associated with"
persons listed or determined to be subject to the order. Taken as an objective test,
these provisions dramatically widen the scope of the blocking to include a broad
range of financial intermediaries and other international middlemen-perhaps
even banks themselves. However, for this class of potentially blockable persons,
section 5 of the order authorizes the Treasury Secretary to take steps in his
discretion short of a complete blocking. This could mean, for example, selective
blocking of accounts; reversal of transactions, restrictions on operations, and the
like. The history of U.S. blocking programs is replete with such examples.
Equally significant in terms of the effects of the blocking on transborder
banking are the provisions of section 1(c) of the order. Targeted persons will also
include persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury (in consultation with
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney
General) to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of, any other
targeted person. In many, if not most situations, this provision will make it very
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difficult for a bank to preplan and monitor compliance with the sanctions, absent
prior notice from Treasury.
Prior notice may well be absent, however. Section 10 of the order eliminates
the necessity of prior notice of any "listing or determination made" pursuant to
the order, at least as to any person who has "a constitutional presence in the
United States." The reason for this provision is the President's finding that prior
notice to targeted persons might make application of these sanctions
"ineffectual," in light of "the ability to transfer funds or assets instantaneously"
in the international financial system.
Perhaps even more ominous in terms of compliance burdens and potential
liability are the provisions of section 2(b) and (c) of the order. Notwithstanding
any preexisting contract or any preexisting license or permit, section 2(b)
prohibits any transaction by a U.S. person or within the United States that evades
or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any
of the prohibitions of the order. Section 2(c) prohibits any conspiracy formed to
violate any of the prohibitions of the order. Conspiracy theory has long been a
fruitful device in federal enforcement, and there is considerable case law and
commentary on the subject. However, what constitutes "avoidance"-as opposed
to intentional evasion-of federal prohibitions remains something of a mystery,
and hence a dangerous source of potential difficulty for banks operating in the
international market. Of course, a bank might be able to show that its involve-
ment in a particular transaction was not initiated with the purpose of avoiding the
prohibition, yet it might still find itself, objectively speaking, involved in a
transaction that in fact avoided the prohibitions. This might well be an
independent basis for enforcement action against the bank.

